Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea in March 2014 sparked so far unrealised international fears that the pro-Russian separatist republic of Transnistria in Moldova might be the next object of Russian territorial revisionism. This article argues that these fears were predicated on faulty assumptions about Russia's interests and capacities in Moldova. It traces the development of Russian policy in the country from 1992-2015, and argues that Russia has primarily been interested in influence over the whole of Moldova rather than Transnistria per se, that Russian policy has been primarily reactive, responding to developments beyond its control, and that these developments frequently show Russia's limited power and ability to enforce its objectives.
mission, a neo-imperial (or neo-Soviet) project of territorial restoration through destabilization and manipulation of neighboring countries, fomentation of protest by Russian minorities, and, in the most extreme cases, annexation. As Andrew Wilson argued, "Putin had started on a lot of unfinished business", declared "...a massive revisionist agenda", and Moldova was one of the states " [m] ost obviously next in the firing line" (2014, 162) .
Fast forward to the time of writing and such fears have not come to pass, despite public requests by the Transnistrian parliament to both Putin and the head of Russia's Duma for either accession to Russia or recognition of Transnistria as a sovereign state (Bocharova and Biriukova 2014; Tanas and Timu 2014) . While Crimea remains firmly annexed and the conflict in eastern Ukraine has tragically left more than 9,000 people dead, Moldova has remained peaceful, save for a wave of protests in 2015-16 by civil society forces of both a pro-European and pro-Russian orientation against the deep political corruption in the country. The Russian government has vocally protested against measures such as the fortification of the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border by the new Ukrainian authorities and Ukraine's ban on Russian servicemen stationed in Transnistria transiting Ukrainian territory, but has shown no inclination to either recognise or annex Transnistria, instead calling for a "special status" for the region within Moldova and even reducing its financial support for the separatist regime (Urbanskaya 2015) . But the perceived threat of Russian intervention is still used by the nominally pro-European Moldovan government to justify its policies of state capture both to its own population and Western policymakers, contributing to the latter's higher tolerance of the Moldovan government's conduct (Nemtsova 2016) .
One explanation for this state of affairs could be that Russia has simply failed to implement its intentions, whether by accident, due to a lack of resources or other constraints. As Wilson also argued, it was unclear whether Russia would be able "to push on all fronts while it was preoccupied in Ukraine, but it was rightly feared that it would when it could" (2014, . A narrative could be constructed whereby an ambitious Putin, buoyed by the relatively easy military victory in Crimea and both overestimating local Russian support and underestimating Ukrainian/Western resolve, gave the go-ahead for the rebellion-cum-insurgency in eastern Ukraine in the hope that it would spread to Moldova and elsewhere, only to later have to (temporarily) scale back his ambitions in response to Western sanctions, falling oil prices and lukewarm local support. This would be a superficially plausible narrative, albeit one which would be impossible to prove without getting inside Putin's head. Moreover, it would still appear to assume the presence of an expansionary ambition driving Russian policy, potentially ignoring the specific context and circumstances of Russia's Moldova policy.
This article argues that by analyzing change and continuity in Russian policy in Moldova on its own terms since the fall of the Soviet Union, a more nuanced understanding can be gained that dictates against the kind of reactions and fears evident around the time of the Crimean annexation. Indeed, the picture that emerges from a closer look at Russia's Moldova policy over time is one of relative disinterest in Transnistria itself (Russia's aim has been influence over Moldova as a whole), as well as of reactive policy making and frequently unsuccessful attempts to assert Russian control and to break through local intransigence and power configurations. This raises questions about the validity of any general narrative about Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, such as the expansionary and revisionist one that has gained prominence post-Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Russian policy in Moldova and Transnistria remains an under-researched area of Russian foreign policy. More topical areas such as Ukraine or relations with the West are usually afforded more ink, both in broader studies and as the topic of specialized studies. Notable exceptions include the specialized work of Andrey Devyatkov (2012a Devyatkov ( , 2012b , Graeme Herd (2007) and Rebecca Chamberlain-Creanga and Lyndon Allin (2010) ; William Hill's (2012) account of his time as head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Moldova; and the literature focusing specifically on Russian policy in the post-Soviet conflicts (e.g. Lynch 2000 Lynch , 2003 Lynch , 2006 Flikke and Godzimirski 2007) . The Transnistria conflict has been more broadly covered in the conflict studies literature, where bodies of work exist covering both the causes of the initial conflict (Kaufman 2001; Ozhiganov 1997; Kaufman and Bowers 1998; Kolstø and Malgin 1998; King 2000; Kolstø 2002) , its prolongation and intractability (King 2001 (King , 2005 Herd 2005; Kolstø 2006; van Meurs 2007; Beyer and Wolff 2016) , and potential ways of solving it (ICG 2003 (ICG , 2004 (ICG , 2006 Lynch 2004; Protsyk 2006; Beyer 2010 Beyer , 2011 Kulminski and Sieg 2010; Wolff 2011 Wolff , 2012 Popescu and Litra 2012) . There is also an increasing number of works focusing on internal developments and state-building in Transnistria (Troebst 2003; Matzusato 2008; Protsyk 2009; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011) . While I draw on all these literatures in the below, my aim in this article is The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, a brief historical background of the Transnistrian conflict is given. In the second section, the evolution of Russian policy towards Moldova and Transnistria over time is described in some depth. In the following three sections, three conclusions are drawn from this analytic description of Russian policy. First, that Russia does not care about Transnistria per se; its support for the separatist republic has been no more than one of many tools by which to achieve its overall objective of maintaining influence in Moldova. Second, that Russian policy has been primarily reactive, responding to events rather than proactively driving them. And third, that despite its apparent position as the dominant regional power, Russia has had a limited ability to influence events on the ground in both Moldova and Transnistria. In the conclusion I consider the implications of these arguments for understandings of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, calling for detailed analysis of Russian policy in each post-Soviet country and conflict on its own terms.
A quintessentially post-Soviet conflict
The Transnistrian conflict's roots were a combination of Soviet nationality policy, an uneven division of resources within the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and the effects of Mikhail Gorbachev's liberalizing reforms. The MSSR, geographically equivalent to the present-day Republic of Moldova, was created during World War Two as an uneasy union of today's Transnistria, a strip of land east of the river Dnestr that had been part of the Soviet Union since the early 1920s and, crucially, had never been part of Romania, and areas west of the Dnestr that had been part of Romania in the inter-war years and the Russian empire previously. The MSSR was multi-ethnic: in 1989 primarily Romanian-speaking Moldovans constituted 64.5% of its total population, Ukrainians 13.8% and Russians 13%. Moldovans were also the largest population group (39.9%) in Transnistria, but here Ukrainians and Russians constituted a combined "Slavic-speaking" majority of 53.8% and Russian was the dominant lingua franca (King 2000) .
Transnistria had come to dominate the MSSR economically and politically: the majority of industry was located there, all the first secretaries of the republic's Communist Party came from the region until 1989 and the majority of the Soviet 14 th Army was stationed there, with its headquarters in the regional capital Tiraspol. This imbalance contributed to the emergence of a privileged, Russian-speaking elite in Transnistria with a strong allegiance to the Soviet Union and Moscow. When Gorbachev's reforms in the second half of the 1980s led to the emergence of a Moldovan national movement that gradually embraced ever more radical aims, including independence and possible re-unification with Romania, the elite in Tiraspol reacted by asserting Russian-speakers' and Transnistria's own right to autonomy from Chisinau (King 2000, 183-84; Kaufman 2001, 146-48) .
The conflict escalated slowly, but surely from 1989 to 1992. New language laws in August 1989 defined Moldovan as the Republic's only state language and Russian as a language for "communication between nationalities" (Pasechnik 1989) . In June 1990, following election victories by the Popular Front of Moldova, the Republic's Supreme Soviet declared Moldova to be a "sovereign state" within the Soviet Union; on September 2 an ad hoc assembly in Tiraspol answered by declaring Transnistria a separate Soviet republic (Kondratov 1990 ). On August 27, 1991, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev in Moscow, Moldova declared its independence (Gamova 1991) . Tiraspol answered with a referendum in December 1991 in which a clear majority supported independence from Moldova and allegiance to the Soviet Union, which ceased to exist within a few weeks as Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan and other leaders established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In parallel with the referendum, Igor Smirnov was elected "president" of the new self-proclaimed republic (Kondratov 1991). 2 At the same time Transnistrian militias gradually established control over police stations and other strategic points east of the Dnestr, receiving arms and support from parts of the 14 th Army, around 80% of whose personnel were from the region, as well as Cossack volunteers from Russia and Ukraine (King 2000, 192-193; Kaufman 2001; Ozhiganov 1997, 179) .
The hostilities culminated on June 19-22, 1992, when a Moldovan attack on the city of Bender, on the Dnestr's west bank, was pushed back by Transnistrian forces and 14 th Army units ("Russia Edges" 1992) . The Army had officially been under Russian command since April 1, 1992 (by decree of the new Russian president, Boris Eltsin) and had maintained official neutrality under orders from the Russian Ministry of Defense, while individual units had openly supported the Transnistrians and commanders and politicians had either washed their hands of responsibility, like Eltsin, or openly encouraged the military to get involved, like Eltsin's Vice President, Aleksander Rutskoi (Gamova and Burbyga 1992) . 3 At Bender, General Aleksander Lebed, who had arrived just days before with a brief to stop the fighting and reestablish Moscow's control over the region's troops and weapons, used a show of force by the Russian troops to achieve both these aims (Ozhiganov 1997, 182 ). On July 21, 1992 Eltsin and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur concluded a bilateral agreement in Moscow to regulate the conflict (Kuznetsova 1992) . To separate the parties, a security zone was established along the Dnestr, and in early August a peacekeeping force consisting of five Russian, three Moldovan and two Transnistrian battalions was introduced, effectively giving Russia control of the force. The 14th Army's neutrality was confirmed, and its withdrawal was to be discussed further in bilateral talks ("Ten peacekeeping" 1992; Tago Markedonov 2007; Solovev 2008b; Hill 2012, 54-55) . 4 A 1993 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) report highlighted early on the incompatibility of the two sides' positions, and called for a "special status" for Transnistria: "[Transnistria] cannot successfully be governed within a centralized state. On the other hand, it cannot hope to obtain international recognition or a 'con-federalization' of Moldova" (CSCE 1993, 1) . Russia has supported a special status for Transnistria, albeit not always in the federation setup evident in the Kozak Memorandum.
Separate from the status issue, another central sticking point has been the withdrawal of Russian troops and military hardware. Despite bilateral and multilateral promises of full withdrawal, around 1,100-1,200 troops still remained as of 2015, as the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) (IISS 2016, 188) . The default Russian position, described in more detail below, has been that full withdrawal should follow conflict resolution, i.e. resolution of the status question -a linkage and "reverse conditionality" that has caused great frustration in both Moldovan and Western circles. 
The evolution of Russian policy
As the former imperial center and dominant regional power, Russia has been involved in Moldova and Transnistria "at all levels and in a myriad ways" (Lynch 2004, 41) . While developing at times close relations with different Moldovan governments, Russia has consistently irritated Chisinau by pushing for a Moldovan acceptance of a Russian troop presence on its soil, and supporting Transnistria's bid for a special status within Moldova. In addition to this political support, it has contributed greatly to Transnistria's survival as a de facto state through economic subsidies such as pension payments for the local population and unclaimed debts for gas deliveries. Russian oligarchs have invested in Transnistrian industry. However, Russia has shown no interest in recognizing Transnistria as an independent state, as it did with the Georgian breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, or annexing it like Crimea, and has consistently stated its support for Moldova's territorial integrity. Below, the development of this apparently paradoxical policy is traced from 1992 until the end of 2015. Moldovan constitution's ban on foreign troops being stationed on Moldovan soil (Bulavinov 1995) .
1992-96: The formation of objectives
Moreover, from 1994, Moscow openly argued that a withdrawal of Russian forces should be "synchronized" with a solution to the Transnistrian conflict maintaining both parties' interests and security. This formulation appeared in the October 1994 Russian-Moldovan agreement and would become a mainstay Russian position, interpreted as full troop withdrawal following conflict resolution. But the aim of maintaining a military presence did not mean that all troops should be kept in Transnistria, especially as they could be better used elsewhere (the first Chechen War started in December 1994). In December 1994 the number of peacekeeping battalions was cut, and in spring 1995 the 14 th Army was reorganized, renamed and its operational staff and officers reduced, prompting General Lebed to resign (Gamova 1994; Musin 1995; Golotiuk 1995) . A first attempt at such reorganization in 1994 had been aborted after much negative press in Russia and strong opposition from Lebed, indicating the issue's controversy (Prikhodko 1994; Egorov 1994 ).
Eltsin and his government were also pushed towards a more assertive policy by Russian legislative bodies' strong support for Transnistria. The Supreme Soviet passed a resolution authorizing the use of the 14 th Army as a "peacemaking" force and accusing Moldova of a "policy of genocide" in July 1992 (Chugaev 1992 ). The 1993-95 State Duma had a high proportion of deputies supporting Transnistria, mainly from the Communist Party and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (Mlechin 1993; Kapustina 1996) . Duma deputies acted as observers at Transnistrian referendums and elections, provided vocal political support for the unrecognised republic, failed to ratify the 1994 treaty on 14 th Army withdrawal, and in May 1995 even adopted a federal law prohibiting such withdrawal (Gamova 1993 (Gamova , 1995 Druz 1995; Zhuravlev 1995) . The unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space served as "convenient springboard[s]" for Duma deputies to attack Eltsinʼs policies (Mlechin 1993) . Thus, while a mediation track was opened by Russia in 1992 and taken over by the CSCE/OSCE with Russia as a guarantor in 1993, conflict resolution was not proactively pursued by Russia in this period.
1996-2003: Attempts at co-operation and conflict resolution
With the military weakened by the Chechen War, in early 1996 the policy-making initiative in the postSoviet space shifted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the new Foreign Minister, Primakov, who in his first press conference promised to redouble efforts to resolve post-Soviet conflicts (Primakov 1996; Shchipanov 1996) . This ushered in a more co-operative and conflict resolution- initially in response to a request by Voronin for a more active Russian mediation. The process ran parallel to the OSCE-led mediation process, and the other mediators were kept largely in the dark about the process and Kozak's role (Hill 2012, 114-52) . As it stood at the time of its proposed signing, the memorandum would have both guaranteed Transnistrian members of a proposed upper house in a unified Moldovan parliament effective veto powers over a vast majority of legislation, and, according to a clause introduced in the final few days allegedly at the behest of the Transnistrian leadership, provided for a Russian peacekeeping presence until 2020 (Kozak 2003; Hill 2012, 139, 147-48) . The memorandum was due to be signed by Voronin and Smirnov with Putin present on November 24, 2003. However, Voronin called off the signing ceremony the night before, with Putin reportedly already on his way to his plane in Moscow. Voronin's decision appears to have been due both to Western pressure, with Western diplomats expressing particular concern about the Russian peacekeeping clause and the potentially unworkable political setup of the proposed federation, and emerging protests by the political opposition and civil society similar to those that had toppled Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze just a few days before (Löwenhardt 2004; Beyer 2010; Hill 2012, 155-56) . The last-minute U-turn brought an abrupt end to the more co-operative period in Russian policy -it came as a great shock to Moscow and created long-lasting bad blood between the Russian and Moldovan sides (see for example the mutual recriminations between Kozak and a key Moldovan negotiator in Kolesnikov [2005] and Tcaciuc [2005] ).
2003-15: Coercion and competitive influence-seeking
In the years following Kozak, Russian policy took a sharply assertive and coercive turn, involving military, In addition to these tried and tested economic measures, Russia increasingly sought to influence the political process both in Chisinau and elsewhere in Moldova. In the winter of 2013-14, bribes were reportedly channeled to Moldovan parliamentarians through the "mafioso" Renato Usatii in an attempt to bring down the government (Wilson 2014, 166) . In February 2014, local authorities in the autonomous republic of Gagauzia organized a referendum, condemned by the national government, in which more than 97% of voters supported closer relations with the Customs Union and opposed further European integration ("Gagauzia Voters" 2014). 6 Before the November 2014 parliamentary election, Putin welcomed two leaders of the pro-Russian Socialist Party, Igor Dodon and Zinaida Greceanîi, to Moscow in a show of support ("Igor Dodon" 2014). However, the nominally pro-European political parties held on for a razor-thin majority, in large part due to the controversial disqualification of Patria, a pro-Russian party led by Usatii, immediately before the election on charges of having received eight million Moldovan lei in illegal support from Russia; other parties led by Usatii had previously been denied registration (""Patria" 
Transnistria is not Russia's objective
The first conclusion to be drawn from the above is that Russia has not cared about Transnistria per se. Its aim in Moldova has been to maintain as much influence as possible over the country as a whole. Its preferred way of achieving this has been to deal directly with governments in Chisinau, concluding bilateral treaties, seeking Chisinau's consent for a permanent Russian military presence or a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict on Russian terms, and pressuring the government towards choosing membership in Eurasian integration projects over European ones. Support for Transnistria's survival has primarily been a means to this end, a way of maintaining a bargaining chip both vis-à-vis Moldovan governments and Western actors.
This conclusion fits very closely with Russia's declared intentions in the post-Soviet space. Since at least the formulation of the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia's official policy in the region has been one of maintaining as much Russian influence as possible. The 1993 Concept officially defined the issues of Russians abroad and regional conflicts as both identity and security issues for Russia, and the entire postSoviet space or "near abroad" as a strategically important region for Russia's security and future development, over which influence had to be exerted. It advocated that Moscow should protect Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics, prevent regional conflicts from escalating and oppose increased third-party influence in the region, using force if necessary ("Foreign Policy" 1993) As can be seen in the above narrative, the reasons for the establishment of this approach as official policy in the early 1990s were primarily located in regional events and domestic politics, while its prolongation in the 2000s became increasingly about international factors. During Eltsin's first presidency, the instability and regional uncertainty caused by the Soviet Union's sudden demise and collapse provided politicians who wanted a dominant regional role for Russia the chance to justify this through the perceived needs to protect the rights of the new Russian diaspora against the threatening nationalizing projects of the newly independent Soviet states and to secure regional stability and Russia's security, thereby pushing the government towards a more assertive position (Kolstø 2000; Melvin 1995, 6-7; Lo 2002, 49-50) . Adding to this initial impetus of regional instability and domestic identity politics, since the mid-1990s and increasingly since the early 2000s, a key driver of Russian policy both in Moldova specifically and the post-Soviet space in general was the perception that it was losing relative regional influence to the West, represented by the expanding membership and influence of the EU and NATO, and the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (see for example Devyatkov 2012b, 191-92; Mankoff 2009; Nygren 2008) . Neither Moldova nor Transnistria were necessarily vital security concerns for Moscow in themselves, but were caught up in the broader regional dynamic. Moldova was seen by Moscow as a potential "domino" for Western influence in more important regional countries such as Ukraine, leading Russia to insist on Moldova's neutrality and to pursue continued influence in the country (Devyatkov 2012a, 55) . Added to this, Russia increasingly saw influence in its own neighborhood as a prerequisite of its self-identification as a great power (Mankoff 2009). As Lynch sums up, Moldova and Transnistria became "a small part of a wider game (...) to ensure that Russia's voice remain[ed] heard across European security matters" (Lynch 2006, 64) .
The implication of the conclusion that Russia cares little about Transnistria per se is that any Russian move to annex the de facto republic or recognize it as a sovereign state is unlikely. Such a move would deprive Russia of its perhaps primary bargaining chip in the struggle for influence over Moldova. Kolstø (2014) argues that Russia "would immediately lose whatever leverage it may still have in Moldovan politics". That may be a slight exaggeration given Russia's above-mentioned close ties to politicians in Moldova proper and Gagauzia. Moreover, while Moldovan politicians and the Moldovan population would be loath to see Transnistria formally separate from Moldova, it is unclear whether the return to the Moldovan political scene of a couple hundred thousand pro-Russian voters and the Transnistrian elite, tipping the overall balance firmly toward pro-Russian political forces, would be welcomed.
If Transnistria itself was a prize asset in Russian identity and strategic thinking, like Crimea, this first reason would be less important. After all, Russia arguably wanted to maintain influence over the whole of Ukraine as well, and yet it still annexed Crimea, greatly damaging its relations with Kiev.
However, Transnistria is nowhere near as important to Russia as Crimea. Consider Putin's justifications for the Crimea annexation in his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on March 18, (2014a .
These ranged from Crimea as the location of Prince Vladimir's adoption of Orthodoxy that "predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus" to a mention of the "legendary city" of Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet, and a lamentation of the 1954 decision to transfer Crimea from the Russian to the Ukrainian Soviet republic. Russia had not simply been "robbed" when Crimea became part of independent Ukraine, Putin argued, it had been "plundered". Such rhetorical flourishes reflected the central position of Crimea as a "lost" Russian land in Russian nationalist discourse, a discourse that Putin had increasingly drawn on in his third term as president (Sakwa 2015, 68; Hopf 2016) . Similar words would be unthinkable in a speech about Transnistria and Tiraspol -even the discourse about a divided Russian nation that has become prominent in recent years would have limited purchase applied to the tiny strip of land and its motley crew of inhabitants (Laruelle 2015) . Transnistria may have had relevance as part of the wider region of Novorossiia, but even that term has disappeared from Putin's discourse since spring 2014 (Laruelle 2016) . This difference also applies to Moldova and Ukraine in general. Ukraine and Ukrainians are regularly referred to by Russian leaders as brothers of Russia, part of the same family with the same religious and cultural heritage (Hopf 2016, 245) . No such pride of place is given to Moldova or Moldovans.
Russian interests and concerns in the country are more limited and concerned primarily with geopolitical aims such as limiting NATO expansion.
Reactive Russia
The second conclusion to draw is that Russian policy in Moldova has been, on the whole, reactive. Despite a relatively clear goal of maintaining influence and a few key aims meant to achieve this goal, such as Moldovan consent to a military presence and a solution to the Transnistrian conflict on Russian terms, there is little evidence of a concerted, overall plan. Instead, Russian policy initiatives frequently appeared driven by external events, as reactions to developments beyond policymakers' control or unrelated to Moldova and Transnistria themselves, such as power struggles in Moscow.
The prime example of this was the way in which Russia became directly involved in the conflict in the chaotic post-Soviet months of 1992. Claus Neukirch argues that the 14 th Army had stopped taking orders from Moscow at least from around September 1991, and the Russian government could not be held responsible for its actions until June 1992, when it installed Lebed as commander (Neukirch 2002, 235-36 ). Lebed's subsequent operation against the Moldovan army had several reinforcing motivations: stopping the fighting from escalating further, securing Russian control over the 14 th Army's personnel (who had been joining the Transnistrian militias) and weapons (which had been stolen or sold by corrupt local commanders), and silencing the nationalist forces in Moscow accusing Eltsin of inaction (Kaufman 2001, 157-58; Ozhiganov 1997, 182; Devyatkov 2012b, 191) . These included the Vice President, Aleksander Rutskoi, who visited Transnistria along with Presidential Adviser Sergei Stankevich in April 1992 and openly supported the separatists, the dominant forces in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Deputies, and several civil society groups calling for the protection of Russians abroad (Kondratov 1992a (Kondratov , 1992b ; "The Sixth" 1992).
Other seemingly proactive Russian measures, including the Moscow Memorandum and the Kozak Memorandum, also appear to have been motivated to a large degree by either reactive or external motivations. The Moscow Memorandum was first launched in the summer of 1996, between the first and second rounds of a Russian presidential election in which Eltsin faced a strong challenger in Communist Party leader Gennadii Ziuganov. A more active policy in the post-Soviet space and the endorsement of General Lebed, who had been eliminated in the first round with 14.5% of the vote, were potentially crucial for Eltsin's chances of re-election (Ionescu 1996) . The memorandum was thus almost certainly motivated as much by domestic concerns as some proactive desire to resolve the Transnistrian conflict or realize Russian aims in Moldova. As Moldova's President Snegur eventually refused to sign the agreement, it was finalized only after the more Moscow-friendly Petru Lucinschi won Moldova's presidential election in December 1996 (Selivanov 1996; Timoshenko 1997) . Lucinschi insisted on a reference to Moldova's territorial integrity, and a compromise was reached whereby a clause was added referring to a "common state" (Prikhodko and Gornostaev 1997) . However, the agreement was vague concerning practical measures for conflict resolution, and was not followed up by Moscow with sufficient pressure on the elites in Chisinau and Tiraspol, both of whom interpreted the agreement and in particular the idea of a "common state" in widely different ways (Vinogradov 1998; Prikhodko and Gornostaev 2000; Hill 2012, 56) . This showed the limits of Russia's interest.
The fact that the Kozak Memorandum would on paper have led to a realization of Russia's aims in the conflict has been taken as evidence of its proactive, manipulative nature. However, even though the secretive mediation process revealed Russia's "habit of unilateral action" (Lynch 2004 ), it does not automatically follow that it was a carefully calculated part of a "project" to re-establish Moscow's power in (OSCE 1999) . Moscow had maintained after Istanbul that it saw withdrawal as conditional on conflict resolution, and post-Kozak argued that the "so-called" Istanbul commitments were only political and not legally binding (Prikhodko 2000; Sisoev 2004; OSCE 2004) . Nevertheless, between 1999 and 2003 it had also signaled that the deadline was taken seriously and removed large parts of the designated equipment (Putin 2000a (Putin , 2001 Hill 2012) . Ignoring the deadline would thus have led at least to a loss of face, and the pressure was on to resolve the matter before the upcoming OSCE Ministerial Council in Maastricht on December 1-2, 2003.
There was also added impetus from both international mediators and Moldova for a solution. The 2003 Dutch OSCE Chairmanship had made the Transnistrian conflict a priority, and President Voronin had both promoted a commission to draft a joint constitution, requested more active Russian involvement in the shape of a presidential representative (a role Kozak eventually filled) and showed an openness to accept a federal solution despite widespread skepticism in Moldova (Löwenhardt 2004; Hill 2012, 86-87 ).
An early draft of Kozak's memorandum, as seen by Hill in September 2003, was closer to Moldova's position than Transnistria's, reflecting the fact that Kozak's mediation was partly a Moldovan-initiated process (Hill 2012, 116-17) . As acknowledged by Hill, in order to be successful in achieving both sides' agreement, Kozak would have to move closer to the Transnistrian position, which had always included demands for a Russian military guarantee. Russia almost certainly used the Transnistrian position to some extent as a convenient cover for its own interests. Combined with the resources put into the process in the form of Kozak's shuttle diplomacy, the memorandum could be called proactive. However, it was also a reactive attempt to realize two related Russian aims in the face of increasing Western influence: the conflict would be solved (at least on paper) on terms favorable to Russia and by Russia, reasserting its regional influence through the assumption of a perceived peace-making success and achieving its aim of institutionalized influence without having to break its Istanbul commitments.
There were several reasons for Russia's Transnistria policy to be reactive rather than proactive in the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the clear aim of increased influence. Firstly, for a long time Russia simply did not have the capacity to use scarce resources on an issue that was secondary to several other domestic and foreign policy questions. The aim of regional hegemony was usually pursued "on the cheap"; this changed only partly in the 2000s with increased economic resources (Lo 2002, 76-77; Mankoff 2009, 81-82) . Secondly, the co-ordination between the different institutions involved in policy making in the post-Soviet space, including the ministries of foreign affairs and defense and the Presidential Administration, was often poor, in the manner of "bulldogs fighting under the rug" to increase their influence (Mankoff 2009, chapter 2).
One could argue that the evolution of Russian policy since 2003 indicates the development of a more proactive approach. The more coordinated coercive approach in the years after Voronin's Kozak snub, the subsequent heavy-handed promotion of regional integration projects and the more direct attempts to influence national and regional Moldovan politics all point in this direction. Russia has certainly developed more strings to its bow in terms of how it seeks to assert its influence, both in Moldova and the post-Soviet space as a whole. It has also become much more assertive and willing to use force to achieve its aims in the region, as evidenced by the 2008 Georgian war and the ongoing Ukraine crisis, in contrast to what many Russians saw as a "supine and defeatist" foreign policy in the 1990s (Sakwa 2008, 249-50) .
However, a substantial part of the explanation for this more proactive approach has been a Russian reaction against the perceived threat to its influence in the post-Soviet space, represented by the eastwards expansion and increased influence of the EU and NATO. The extent to which this factor is decisive in explaining Russian assertiveness is hotly debated, with many analysts preferring to emphasize instead factors such as Putin's personality or Russian great-power ideology as drivers of policy (see Götz [2016] for an overview). But that it forms part of the explanation is without doubt, and in the case of Thus, while Russian policy in Moldova has become more assertive in recent years, this has primarily been in response to and in an attempt to revive lost influence. Moreover, even with the development of a more proactive policy, Russia has been unable to manipulate events fully to its advantage.
Moscow's limited power
The third and final conclusion to draw from a survey of Russia's Moldova policy over the past two decades is that for a country with aspirations to great power dominance, Russia has had a hard time imposing its will. This has been true of its relations with successive Moldovan governments, who have increasingly been assisted by the possibility of support from the West. However, it has also been the case in its relations with the Transnistrian regime, questioning the notion, prevalent in the West and in official Moldovan discourse, that the Transnistrian leadership has been merely a foreign stooge more or less directly controlled from Moscow (Lynch 2004, 41, 74-81 ). Despite its reliance on Russian support, the Transnistrian leadership was also frequently a challenging partner for Russia, rather than a puppet it could control at will. Even if Tiraspol could not directly oppose Moscow, Smirnov ("president" from 1991 and his allies used their power on the ground to counteract Russian troop withdrawal, pressure Moscow for money as compensation for munitions they argued were Transnistrian property, and oppose a solution to the conflict that did not take account of their interests (Prikhodko and Gornostaev 2000; Sergeev and Volkhonski 2000) . As argued by Hill, had the Russian government put all its might behind forcing the Transnistrians to comply with the withdrawal of Russian weapons, Tiraspol would have had to comply. However, several of the local Russian commanders and soldiers still sympathized with the Transnistrian cause, and Moscow was often reluctant to force the issue (Hill 2012, 69-70 ). Tiraspol's moves could be petty, but effective: following the conclusion of the Moscow Memorandum, for example, the Transnistrians failed to show up for a scheduled meeting between the mediators and the two sides hosted by Russia at Meshcherino in September 1997, marking "the beginning of a four-year pattern of obstruction, evasion, and delay" (Hill 2012, 56 (Solovev 2006c) .
Corruption in Smirnov's immediate circle also contributed to dissatisfaction in Moscow, for example the revelation that large parts of "humanitarian aid" delivered by Moscow in 2006 had been used for state and security services wages, and the siphoning off of gas revenues due to Gazprom (Solovev 2008a ). 7 From around 2000, Russia attempted to build up an opposition to Smirnov, probably with the hope of eventually replacing him with a more easily controllable leader or make him more controllable by reminding him that he was replaceable. However, he was re-elected in both (ICG 2004 . When Smirnov's political power was finally broken with his exit in the first round of the December 2011 "presidential" election, Moscow's preferred candidate, Anatolii Kaminskiii, proceeded to lose in the second round. The winner, Evgenii Shevchuk, was equally pro-Russian and the result thus represented only a small loss of prestige for Russia, but the process once again illustrated its limited ability to dictate the course of events on the ground (Reutov 2011) . As long as cautious support for Tiraspol was seen as a key tool in Russia's quest for continued influence in Moldova, the Transnistrian regime was able to resist Russian pressure to a certain extent, safe in the knowledge that Russian support would not be completely cut.
Conclusion
Prediction is perilous, but based on the above analysis of Russian policy towards Moldova and Transnistria over the past two-and-a-half decades, Transnistria is very unlikely to be the "next Crimea".
Aside from the practical difficulties of annexing and administering a territory with which it does not share a border, such a move would undermine Russia's attempts to maintain influence in Moldova proper and would be worth little in terms of strategic or political benefit. Of course, similar things could have been This of course assumes that there is in fact no proactive, grand plan driving Russian policy, merely halted by limited resources. One could argue that the annexation of Crimea has set a new precedent in terms of how far Russia is willing to go to achieve its aims in the post-Soviet space. This may be true, but it does not follow that Russia's interests and priorities are uniform across the post-Soviet space. Even a cursory glance at the separate post-Soviet conflicts reveals a different approach from Russia in each case, rather than some blanket imperialist project (cf Markedonov 2015) , and the same is true for policies towards the different post-Soviet states. Thus, while one should not draw conclusions about Russia's policy in Ukraine or Crimea based on its approach to Moldova or Transnistria, the same applies vice versa: each case has a specific context and dynamic that should be analyzed in its own right, informing our understandings of Russia's multiple policies (rather than one single policy) in the post-Soviet space. This should make Western policymakers think twice about tolerating the undemocratic tendencies and corruption of the nominally pro-European parts of Moldova's elite, at least if such indulgence is made on the assumption of creating a bulwark against imminent Russian aggression. Recent protests and elections in Moldova indicate that such indulgence only adds to popular frustration and increases the likelihood of pro-Russian parties' success.
Notes
1. For the sake of simplicity, the Romanian "Transnistria" is used throughout this article both about the separatist republic and the geographical area it encompasses, while the Russian "Dnestr" is used about the river separating this area from the rest of Moldova. No political stance is implied.
2. As with more recent referendums in the post-Soviet space, it is doubtful whether this result accurately represented public opinion (see Kaufman 2001, 150-51) . However, it is entirely plausible that a majority of the Transnistrian population did support independence, given the hostile rhetoric in both Moldova and Transnistria at the time.
3. On 27 May, Eltsin ordered the Army's withdrawal, but his order had little or no effect on its dispositions and a serious attempt to implement it would potentially have caused mutiny on the ground (Litovkin 1992; Taylor 1997) . 4. This did not change with the change of "president" in Transnistria from Igor Smirnov to Evgenii Shevchuk in 2011, although Shevchuk was more pragmatic regarding practical and technical cooperation. 5. Both these and previous gas price increases arguably had commercial as well as political motivations, in particular ones in the late 1990s. See Devyatkov (2012b, 185-86). 6. Gagauzia is a small territory in southern Moldova with a population of around 100,000-150,000.
The Turkic, Christian ethnic group the Gagauz make up more than 80% of the territory's population. The territory shared similar concerns to Transnistria in the early 1990s but an autonomy arrangement was negotiated and signed in 1994. However, it is still the most proRussian region in Moldova outside of Transnistria. See Tudoroiu (2016) for an in-depth analysis of recent events in the region.
7. Gazprom's non-collection of payment from Transnistria was almost certainly intentional and meant as an unofficial subsidy; the problem arose when it emerged that Smirnov's government had collected payments from the population that then went unaccounted for.
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